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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDITH H. DIENES and 
DIANNE D. McMAIN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 
SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE . 11048 
COMPANY, a Washington ~ 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE 
WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY IN UN-
AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE. 
The Court's opinion observes that "Plaintiffs' 
request for an instruction on their theory of the 
case was refused." The decision does not specify 
which of the Plaintiffs' requested instructions, 16, 
17, 18 or 19 is referred to. Defendant does not deny 
that Plantiffs were entitled to have their theory of 
the case presented to the jury, but the Court was 
not required to submit it in the language of the re-
quested instructions. It is sufficient that all the in-
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structions when considered together, cover the issues 
and the applicable principles of law in such a way 
that the jury will understand them. Macshara vs. 
Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756, Ostertag 
vs. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022. The 
Plaintiffs' right to recover was succinctly stated in 
the Court's Instruction No. 15 which reads as fol-
lows: 
"In order to prove the essential elements 
of plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
in the case the following proposition: That the 
death of Lewis Dienes was a result of bodily 
injuries effected solely through external, vio-
lent and accidental means." 
The Court's opinion states that because the in-
struction was in the policy language, the jury was 
permitted to determine the legal effect of the words 
of the policy. The Court said that the language of 
the policy means " ... that Plaintiffs may recover 
if the insured died as a result of injuries sustained 
solely by external, violent and accidental means". 
The Court's interpretive language, '' ... result of 
injuries sustained solely by external, violent and 
accident mean," does not differ from the policy 
language in any m a t e r i a 1 respect. The phrase 
"bodily injuries" appears in the policy and is even 
more explicit than the term "injuries" used by the 
Court. The Court chose to substitute "sustained" for 
the policy term "effected". Either word clearly con-
veys the idea that before liability would arise, the 
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injuries had to result solely through "external, vio-
lent and accidental means." The Court also substi-
tuted the term "by" for the policy 1 an g u age 
"through". 
It is submitted that the trial court's Instruction 
No. 15 did, in fact, present the Plaintiffs' theory 
of recovery in essentially the very language suggest-
ed in the Court's opinion. The variance is in choice 
of words and not in the substance of the idea being 
expressed. Surely the jury was as capable of under-
standing the instruction as given as the language 
contained in the Court's decision. 
Although the decision discusses rules which 
apply in construing ambiguous insurance contracts, 
the reasoning and very language of the Court ne-
gates any such ambiguity in the instruction of the 
Trial Court concerning it. The reasoning and lan-
guage of the Court's decision should be considered 
an affirmance of the Trial Court's instruction ra-
ther than a basis for finding it ambiguous. 
POINT II 
THE COURT IN RENDERING ITS OPINION 
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT 
EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT I'T. 
There was a sharp dispute at trial in the medi-
cal testimony concerning the cause of death. Dr. 
Smith was of the opinion that the automobile acci-
dent was a contributing factor to the final heart 
attack ( R. 86). Pathologist Carlquist made no at-
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tempt to relate the accident to the heart attack. 
Heart specialist Dr. George Curtis, was of the opin-
ion that the accident had no connection with Mr. 
DiEnes' death ( R. 123, 125). The Court, in the 
recent language of Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 436 P.2d 
442, 20 Utah 2d 210, ( 1968), has the " ... duty to 
assume that the jury believed the evidence which 
supports (the jury) verdict and ... to review the 
evidence whatever inference can fairly and reason-
ably be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to it." Additionally, the verdict carries with it a 
"presumption of validity." Brereton vs. Dixon, 443 
P.2d 3, 20 Utah 2d 64 (1967). The compelling con-
clusion in the present case is that the jury believed 
the testimony of Dr. Curtis and found as a fact that 
DiEnes' death was not related to the accident. Any 
other conclusion does violence to the verdict return-
ed by the jury in this case and denies it the effect 
this Court has repeatedly held it to be entitled. 
These presumptions make the general verdict very 
clear and it should not be stricken down for vague-
ness. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion states: 
"From the general verdict rendered by 
the jury, it is not possible for us to know 
whether the jury found as a fact that death 
was caused by a heart attack independent of 
injuries received in the accident or whether 
death resulted from a heart attack induced by 
such injuries and which otherwise would not 
have occurred at that time." 
This Court has recently reaffirmed the tradi-
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tional role of an appellant tribunal in the following 
words: 
"In view of the contentions made to up-
set this judgment, it seems necessary to re-
state and emphasize that upon appeal it is our 
duty to assume that the jury believed the evi-
dence which supports their verdict; and for 
that reason, to review the evidence of what-
ever inferences can fairly and reasonably be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to it." Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 436 P.2d, 442, 
443, 20 Utah 2d 210, (1968). See also Brere-
ton vs. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 443 P.2d 3, 
(1967). 
Additionally, the policy itself specifically ex-
cludes recovery under the policy for death caused 
by disease. 
Although the Court could have required the 
jury to return a special verdict or to answer special 
interrogatories in connection with the general ver-
dict, none were requested by counsel. There is an 
inference in the Court's opinion that this procedure 
should have been followed in this case. However, 
that determination is properly left to the discretion 
of the trial judge (Rule 49 U.R.C.P.). Uncertainty 
has not infrequently arisen in interpreting special 
findings. See liVarner vs. United States Mutual Ac-
cident Association, 32 P. 696, 8 Utah 431; Schweit-
zer vs. Stone, 371 P.2d 201, 13 Utah 2d 199. The 
presumptions favoring the validity of a verdict ap-
ply to a general as well as to a special verdict to 
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avoid the temptation to violate the sanctity of jury 
findings. 
The Court's opinion refers to the case of Brown-
ing vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 
532, 72 P.2d 1060, for the proposition that ambigu-
ous statements in an insurance policy are to be en-
forced against the insurer. This is not contested, but 
the Browning decision has greater significance in 1 
this case, because it carefully analyzes policy pro-
visions similar to those contained in the present 
policy: 
"An injury effected through violent, ex-
ternal and accidental means, entirely inde-
pendent of all other causes, have made three 
distinctions or classes of cases : ( 1) When an 
accident causes a diseased condition which, to-
gether with the accident, results in the injury 
or death complained of, the accident alone is 
to be considered as the cause of the injury or 
death. (Citing cases) (2) When, at the time 
of the accident, the insured was suffering 
from some disease, but the disease had no 
causal connection with the injury or death 
resulting from the accident, the accident is to 
be considered the sole cause. (Ci ting cases) 
(3). \\t7hen at the time of the accident there 
was an existing disease which, cooperating 
with the accident, resulted in the injury or 
death, the accident cannot be considered as 
the sole cause, or as the cause independent of 
all other causes. (Citing cases)" 
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The facts in the present case are even stronger 
in favor of the jury verdict than the findings neces-
sary to deny recovery under Browning. Mr. DiEnes 
suffered from a serious heart disease before the ac-
cident which had shown symptoms of the progressive 
deterioration of his entire body to the extent that 
death was imminent at any time. There was suf-
ficient evidence to permit the jury to find that it 
was the sole cause of death. 
'The opinion in the present case indicates that 
under this type of policy there can be a recovery 
" ... when death results from injuries and would 
not have occurred at that time except for those in-
juries." Even application of this principle in the 
present case does not justify overturning the jury 
verdict because there was sufficient testimony to 
support the jury's finding that the injuries DiEnes 
sustained in the accident had no connection with 
his death. There is a presumption that the jury so 
found. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff's theory of the case was submitted 
to the jury in almost the identical language of the 
Court's opinion. The jury was as capable of under-
standing the Trial Court's instruction as a new jury 
would be of the language contained in the opinion. 
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Further, there was sufficient evidence, in addition 
to legal presumptions, to support the jury's No 
Cause for Action verdict. 
Respectfully submitted 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
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Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
